This article was downloaded by: [University of Nebraska, Lincoln]
On: 13 October 2014, At: 17:09
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ujic20

Bernard Schuster and Joseph Katz: KGB Master Spies in the United States

Earl M. Hyde

Published online: 29 Oct 2010.

To cite this article: Earl M. Hyde (1999) Bernard Schuster and Joseph Katz: KGB Master Spies in the United States, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 12:1, 35-57, DOI: 10.1080/088506099305214

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/088506099305214

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "Content") contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms

& Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Downloaded by [University of Nebraska, Lincoln] at 17:09 13 October 2014

Downloaded by [University of Nebraska, Lincoln] at 17:09 13 October 2014

EARL M. HYDE, JR.

Bernard Schuster and Joseph Katz: KGB Master Spies in the United States

The Soviet Union conducted an extensive and continuous espionage attack against the security institutions — political, economic, and scientific — of the United States virtually from the time of Washington's diplomatic recognition of the USSR in 1932.

That attack continued not only during the time the USSR was allied with Nazi Germany from 1939 until it was attacked by Germany in 1941 but during the war years 1942–1945, when the United States and the USSR were allied against the Axis powers.

During World War II, the Soviet Union ran espionage operations against the War and State Departments, the War Production Board, the Office of Economic Warfare, and even the Office of the President of the United States. It successfully penetrated each institution, and stole the secrets of many other organizations concerned with national security, especially the critical defense industries.

To accomplish its purpose the Kremlin perverted the function of official representation of Soviet institutions such as its embassy, consulates, Tass news agency, the Soviet Red Cross, and Amtorg to serve as cover units for espionage.

Earl M. Hyde, Jr., was a Central Intelligence Agency officer for 30 years. The first half of his career was spent in the Intelligence Directorate doing analysis of East European matters, and the next 15 years were spent abroad in the Operations Directorate serving in Europe and the Far East, as well as in counterintelligence, including work on Venona matters. He received an M.A. degree from the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and a Diplome from the Insitut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationales in Switzerland.

The main thrust of this hostile subversive program was to give impetus to the Soviet drive for world revolution; to increase the political power of its surrogate, the Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA); and to strengthen its own economy by economic and scientific espionage, but principally it sought to weaken and subvert the government of its "main enemy," the United States.

A major instrument of Moscow's policy was the CPUSA. Many of America's liberal political elite still refuse to acknowledge this, despite the evidence that the Communist Party was one of the main sources of spies suborned by the KGB* to work against their own country. The mantle of protective fiction spread around Alger Hiss also covered the espionage of some members of the CPUSA.

My purpose here is to show one aspect of Soviet policy toward the United States, the extent and technique of KGB operations, and the use of the Communist Party. Although Hiss, Earl Browder, Julius Rosenberg, and many Soviet spies were CPUSA members, non-party leftists were also eager to work against the interests of their country.

Two lesser-known master spies of concern are Joseph Katz, who served the KGB for more than ten years as a superb multifunctional agent and who managed the other, Bernard L. Schuster, the organizational secretary of the Communist Party in New York.

NEW INFORMATION

A clearer picture of the Soviet espionage campaign appeared in 1995 when the United States National Security Agency (NSA) published a large number of decrypted intelligence messages sent between Moscow and its KGB stations in the United States. "Venona" was the cover name of the interception and decoding project. The publication of these documents was greeted with much skepticism and considerable dismay by the die-hard defenders of the integrity of the CPUSA.

Given the volume of communication during the war years between Moscow's intelligence headquarters and its espionage centers in the United States, the number of deciphered texts published was minuscule, although the impact was explosive, including headlines in the press and continuing reportage.

The National Security Agency reported that, according to the serial numbers of the Venona cables, thousands were sent but only a fraction were available to the cryptoanalysts. Approximately 2,200 of the messages were decrypted and translated; some 50 percent of the 1943 GRU-Naval Washington to Moscow messages were broken out, but none for any other year, although several thousand were sent between 1941 and 1945.[1]

*The well-known term KGB is used here throughout to designate the Soviet secret service.

Downloaded by [University of Nebraska, Lincoln] at 17:09 13 October 2014

The decryption rate of the KGB cables was:

1942	1.8%
1943	15.0%
1944	49.0%
1945	1.5%[2]

The cables show the extensive use of Communist Party members for espionage against their own country. Over 200 persons under cover name or real name were found to be clandestine contacts or controlled assets. Many have been identified, and those revelations tell a tragic story of disloyalty and betrayal. The 200 do not include the GRU and KGB officers mentioned in the cables.[3]

The Venona corpus is mainly concerned with KGB tradecraft in the United States. The volume of security information purloined by the KGB was so great that much had to be sent by film via courier. One report refers to an agent cover-named "Robert," who had sent 56 rolls of film to Moscow.[4] He ran a network of spies in major U.S. government institutions; it was his material that Elizabeth Bentley referred to when she told the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that she carried photocopies from Washington to New York in her knitting bag.

Members of the liberal elite have claimed over the years that the CPUSA has never been connected with Soviet espionage despite a solid body of evidence to the contrary. For example, Victor Navasky, then editor of the leftist *The Nation* published an article identifying Communist Victor Perlo as merely a "New Deal economist."[5]

Perlo may have been an economist, but he was also a Communist and the head of a spy network, as will be shown later.

In a like vein, David Caute wrote in *The Great Fear* (1978) "that there is no documentation in the public record of a direct connection between the American Communist Party and espionage during the entire Cold War period."[6]

Refutation of those claims rests on numerous accounts, such as those of defectors Elizabeth Bentley, Whitaker Chambers, Igor Gouzenko (a KGB code-clerk), the convictions of Alger Hiss, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Allan Num-May, Harry Gold, Klaus Fuchs, David Greenglass, William Remington, and congressional hearings which elicited confessions from others, such as Julian Wadleigh of the Department of Commerce.

Objective research during the post-World War II years would have refuted such dogma, but sworn testimony can be discounted to an uninformed public. The ongoing leftist canard of no spies in the CPUSA, however, was shown to be a flagrant deception of the American people when the NSA published the Venona

Downloaded by [University of Nebraska, Lincoln] at 17:09 13 October 2014

communications. These espionage directives from Moscow and the replies from the United States described in detail Soviet spying operations and identified the spies. These revelations at least temporarily shook the ground upon which the leftist media and revisionist academics stood.

THE SECRET TEAM

The actions of Joseph Katz and Bernard Schuster show the importance of the Venona intercepts and FBI investigations.

Although numerous Soviet agents named in Venona had important roles in KGB espionage, the collaboration of Katz and Schuster was especially significant because Katz was a senior KGB officer and Schuster was an official of the CPUSA.

Katz was probably the most versatile of the KGB's American recruits. His operations were first disclosed to the FBI by Elizabeth Bentley, a KGB network handler who defected from the party in 1945. With lengthy experience and great success, the known list of those Katz managed at one time or another is mind-boggling. They include Bentley and her extensive network of U.S. government penetrations; Thomas L. Black, a 10-year KGB industrial spy; Morris Cohen (also known as Peter Kroger), who recruited an important atomic energy scientist (never identified); Harry Gold, also an atomic energy spy; Amadeo Sabatini, an active KGB agent on the East and West coasts; Bernard L. Schuster, a ranking official in the New York CPUSA (the operational recruiter and conduit for members of the CPUSA into the ranks of the KGB); Helen Tenney and Duncan C. Lee of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS); and others, some of whom are known and some about whom we may safely surmise.

Katz ran surveillance for the KGB, including that of the defected Soviet spy and Stalin target, General Walter Krivitsky. Prior to his assassination in Washington, D.C., Krivitsky had been Stalin's chief espionage agent in Western Europe. Katz may have been an accomplice in that murder.

Katz also established commercial companies to provide cover for Soviet spies. His versatility included skills such as safecracking, lock-picking, electronic bugging, and jiujitsu, as well as being a crack shot. Where Katz was trained in specialized clandestine techniques is probably unknown to American counterintelligence organizations. The likelihood is that he was recruited as a young man and trained in the USSR.

While these functions were individually of great value to the KGB, his versatility was his greatest asset since the KGB could rely on him to step into an operation as a trouble-shooter at any time. The KGB Venona cables describe some of the operations he was called on to conduct. FBI interrogations and the Bentley disclosures reveal much about the man, but his story is incomplete, as is that of virtually every KGB

Downloaded by [University of Nebraska, Lincoln] at 17:09 13 October 2014

agent who has never defected and written a book or who was never caught and debriefed as was the case with both Black and Gold.

As to his proficiency as a spy, a memo from the Assistant Director of the Domestic Intelligence Division of the FBI, Alan H. Belmont, to D. M. Ladd, head of all investigation operations and number three in the FBI hierarchy, stated that:

> It is felt that Joseph Katz' importance as a Soviet agent in the U.S. cannot be overestimated and it would be extremely important to us if we could get him back in the U.S. and obtain his cooperation. In addition it would appear likely that he could be prosecuted for his activity in Soviet espionage in the U.S. If he were cooperative the possibility of prosecuting a number of persons in the Silvermaster network would be greatly enhanced.[7]

One of the most important espionage operations the KGB assigned to Joseph Katz was management of the "First Line," that part of the KGB mission aimed at recruiting selected members of the CPUSA as spies for the Soviet Union.

Katz's management of agent spotter and recruiter Bernard Schuster, the Organizational Secretary of the New York District of the CPUSA, was a major function of the First Line, and one of the main sources of KGB American agents. (There were a number of these lines, each of which was assigned a specific operational mission. The White Line was targeted at Russian emigrés. The Economic Line concentrated on technical and scientific espionage.[8])

Schuster was identified in November 1945 when Bentley named him an espionage agent who "turned contacts for espionage over to us," meaning Jacob Golos, Schuster's friend and KGB controller, and Bentley herself, then Golos's assistant. Golos, a naturalized Russian Jew, was first a Comintern agent and later a leading KGB agent who recruited and ran networks of spies. In addition to establishing commercial cover concerns with money from Earl Browder, General Secretary of the CPUSA, he headed the dreaded Central Control Commission (discipline) which planned the execution of Juliet Poyntz, an American defector from the GRU, the Soviet military espionage organization.[9] Schuster and Golos met frequently at the Golos-controlled World Tourist Office.[10] Schuster surfaced again when Louis Budenz, editor of the *Daily Worker*, defected and testified before Congress that "Comrade Chester" (Schuster's cover name) was a "nefarious underground agent who directed the infiltration of the U.S. National Guard and other organizations in New York and New England areas for the Soviet Fifth Column."[11]

Budenz asserted that Schuster had assigned a woman named Ruby Weil to "a secret KGB training school (or infiltration unit)" from which she was to contribute to the murder of Leon Trotsky by introducing her friend Sylvia Angeloff to Ramon Mercader. Angeloff in turn introduced Mercader into the Trotsky household, making the murder possible.[12]

Downloaded by [University of Nebraska, Lincoln] at 17:09 13 October 2014

Elizabeth Bentley had accidentally encountered a highly agitated Schuster in New York in early 1945. He told her that agent members of the CPUSA he had been turning over to her and Golos were being "smashed up," were nervous wrecks, needed psychiatric care, and were of no use to the party after the KGB had gotten control of them.[13] At the time of this encounter, Bentley was beginning to withdraw from the KGB on the same basis, namely, the damaging effect of KGB pressures and the strain of espionage on the American informants.[14] For the same reason, she was resisting handing over to the Russian KGB handlers the Perlo and Silvermaster networks and the singleton agents she was managing.

Golos died in November 1943. The management of his spotting and recruitment work among members of the CPUSA for the KGB was taken over by Joseph Katz in mid–1944, while Bentley continued as manager-courier. Katz was extremely active at this time; the Katz-Schuster program funneled an impressive number of potential and actual agents into an active life in Soviet espionage.

The Venona KGB cables between New York and Moscow show that Schuster was an important factor in combing the East Coast CPUSA membership for agents, said by Washington, D.C. KGB Resident Anatoli Gromov to be "the reservoir from which we draw most of our agents."[15]

Schuster's position as Secretary of the New York Branch of the Communist party gave him a wide range of acquaintances and access to files for vetting potential agents before they were turned over to Katz. For example, the KGB Resident in Washington cabled Moscow on 23 January 1945 that the checking of Seville Savoy Sax (cover name "Star") and Theodore Alvin Hall (cover name "Young") had been entrusted to Schuster (cover names in cables: "Echo," "Chester," "Dik").[16]

Theodore Hall became a KGB atomic spy who reported the names of scientists working at Los Alamos in preparation for the first atom bomb test in 1945. Sax was Hall's friend at Harvard who steered him to the Communist Party.[17]

Schuster's vetting gave an all-clear signal for recruitment of Hall as a likely agent. Although never arrested, Hall was identified as a KGB agent by the Venona cables. Prosecuting him would have revealed to the KGB that its cables were being decrypted, thereby jeopardizing the entire Venona project.

THE FIRST LINE GROUP

The work Katz and Schuster did for the KGB, as detailed in Venona, included an important connection with Julius Rosenberg, a member of a cell of Communist engineers recruited originally by Jacob Golos for information on military electronic developments in the U.S. government. Rosenberg was sentenced to death in April, 1951, as a Soviet atomic spy.[18]

Downloaded by [University of Nebraska, Lincoln] at 17:09 13 October 2014

Downloaded by [University of Nebraska, Lincoln] at 17:09 13 October 2014

Schuster's knowledge of the role of Rosenberg's group emphasizes further the importance of Katz's First Line group. The KGB's New York Resident cabled Moscow on 21 September 1944 about Schuster's monthly meetings with Rosenberg to receive "payment of Communist party dues." The same cable contained a Schuster inquiry as to whether KGB headquarters was satisfied with his collaboration with Rosenberg, and if any misunderstandings existed. The New York Resident in the same cable requested permission to allow Rosenberg to ask Schuster for leads to people working on the Manhattan Project and in other technical fields.[19]

Rosenberg in turn recruited David Greenglass, another atomic spy.

Another Moscow cable referred to the transfer of a potential agent, cover–named "Sherpa," to Katz rather than having Schuster run him before he had been judged according to the "value of the materials" he had provided and "before he has been signed on."[20]

While "Sherpa" remains unidentified, he most likely came from the CPUSA, the prime source of Schuster's recruits. Katz would take over after Schuster had vetted and recruited the asset, either to manage his operations or insert him into an agent network run by another operator.

In a more complicated operation, in May 1944 Schuster was directed to travel from New York to Chicago to pick up a letter from "Olsen," the district leader of the Chicago Communist Party. The letter was to be the basis for contacting "Ramsey" (also unidentified) who had been meeting with "Olsen's" wife, an active Communist.[21]

In July 1944 a KGB follow-up cable reported that Schuster had gotten two letters from "Victor" (an unidentified cover name) and "Rose Olsen," both directed to the aforementioned "Ramsey." "Rose" asks him to acquaint (several words not decrypted) "friend." Following another undecipherable gap, Katz's cover name appears.[22] It is likely that "Ramsey" was to be recruited as a KGB agent and was to come under Katz's wing. Thus another Katz-Schuster KGB operation was launched, possibly for agent-spotting in the Chicago area. On 18 September 1944, in that connection, the Resident in New York referred to Katz transmitting a Moscow directive which was being "entrusted to Schuster." That operation was to be somewhat "protracted" because Katz had left New York for the West Coast; Schuster was on leave and "Phlox" (Floks), an unidentified cover name, was with her husband in Ramsey's area (Chicago), and would not be able to meet Schuster in New York for about three weeks.[23]

This cable does name the principals in the "Ramsey" operation, and with Floks and her husband being in Ramsey's area, if it dealt with Ramsey, presumably, Floks on the spot could do whatever was operationally necessary. Therefore, this sounds like a different operation from the foregoing "Ramsey" project, requiring either

Schuster, Katz, or Floks, or all three. It may also have meant a new recruitment operation, or another support assignment for Schuster and Katz. The role of Floks is still unclear. Katz was not available at that time because he had gone to the West Coast to meet Amadeo Sabatini to arrange a recontact. Sabatini was a KGB agent who had served under Katz in other operations, notably in the surveillance and probably the murder of General Krivitsky.

The "Ramsey" operation, however, was progressing, albeit very slowly. In December 1944, New York cabled that Schuster was in direct contact with Floks's husband, but not with Floks herself, and that the husband was to see Ramsey to avoid a "superfluous stage for transmitting instructions."[24]

Although the operations target is unclear, given the patchy data, it comes through that Ramsey was a valuable target and was effectively recruited since he was "receiving instruction." It is equally clear that Schuster played a central role in the operation, because a Moscow cable in March 1945 gave approval for "our operational worker" to meet Floks or her husband, but only after New York had cabled the results of Schuster's "conversations with Floks and her husband whether they knew about our. . ." [decryption ends].[25] Since Floks and husband were fully operational it doesn't seem likely that Schuster was tightening the recruitment, but was instead briefing them on aspects of the assignment which involved their meeting with "our operational worker." The last is an unusual term since cables generally used cover names. Such terminology was at one time used to identify Thomas Lessing Black, a Katz agent, an industrial chemist, targeted at the Bureau of Standards, in that particular instance. The term generally signified a KGB officer.

Additional cables and reports give further evidence of the usefulness of Schuster to Katz and the KGB.

The New York Resident, on 26 May 1944, informed Moscow that Schuster had reported that "Chen," a cover name identified as Zalmond David Franklin, was breaching security by claiming to work for the KGB. New York proposed that he be put in cold storage, instead of being met once a month as in the past, while awaiting Moscow's reply to the proposal to drop him from "liaison" (operation) as "unsuitable." Katz was to have him write a detailed report on his activities, and then Katz would stop meeting him using the pretext of an upcoming journey, but would have Schuster continue to study his conduct.[26]

Evidently the Schuster-Katz operations impressed Moscow. New York cabled that the Katz First Line group was to have a new dimension because Vladimir S. Pravdin, editor of the Tass News Agency in New York, had agreed to "direct liaison" (operational espionage contact) with Katz's First Line Group, which was being reformed.[27] The establishment of Katz's "liaison" with Tass suggests that Tass

Downloaded by [University of Nebraska, Lincoln] at 17:09 13 October 2014

was to be an agent-spotting organization to feed the First Line pool, with Katz acting as an intermediate manager and/or recruiter once Pravdin had identified the targets. This is operationally enigmatic since it would be an overstretch for Katz and Schuster to work in Chicago as well as New York and Washington. Therefore, the likelihood is that Pravdin would spot contacts in the media field, such as I. F. Stone, and funnel them on to Katz and Schuster.

Pravdin's venture may give the appearance of a new Soviet operation but it, of course, was not. Tass had been engaged in espionage from its inception in the United States, in accordance with standard Soviet procedure.

Most probably, the Tass spotting function was put under Katz to improve its effectiveness, and may have been a part of the KGB attempt to tighten security and speed up operations, anticipating the arrival of Anatoli Gromov, the new Resident. Gromov was to be a very hard-driving head of mission.

In this connection, as early as the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942, according to FBI reports, Jacob Golos sent Bentley to meet a KGB agent to be known only as "Margaret." That was the only contact Bentley had with Margaret until Golos ordered recontact in October 1943, one month prior to his death. At that meeting Margaret was to introduce a new contact to Bentley, to be known as "Catherine." Margaret was subsequently identified by the FBI from photographs as Olga Pravdina, a Russian employee of Amtorg, who later returned to Russia with her husband Vladimir Pravdin, the head of Tass in New York.[28]

The new contact, "Catherine," real name Helen Lowry, turned out to be the niece of Earl Browder, the wife and link to Bentley's next KGB contact "Bill," who was the KGB star deep-cover agent Iskhak Abdulovich Akhmerov, alias Bill Grienke, Michael Green, Michael Adamec.[29]

Akhmerov was closely associated with Joseph Katz. He had turned his surveillance operations over to Katz, and Katz had succeeded him as the superior of Bentley and her web of agents. He was almost certainly Alger Hiss's case officer. And he was also Stalin's personal representative to Harry Hopkins, who he considered an agent of "major significance" but "an unconscious rather than a conscious agent."[30] Akhmerov left the United States soon after Bentley defected to the FBI.

In yet another Katz operation, the New York Resident cabled Moscow that a potential recruit, cover-named "Ben" (unidentified), who has been "in touch with Katz' wife (Bessie) can be turned over to Katz."

The same cable stated that Judith Coplon, an important penetrator of the Department of Justice, and her recruiter, Flora Don Wovschin, are put on "ice" and the question was asked of Moscow if it was advisable to "turn over one or the other

Downloaded by [University of Nebraska, Lincoln] at 17:09 13 October 2014

of Schuster's Communists, for instance, Flora D. Wovschin, to Leg" (unidentified cover-name).[31] This cable established a Schuster connection with Coplon and her recruiter, Wovschin.

The question remains as to a Moscow directive to put probationers (KGB agents) on ice until the arrival of "special work," probably a person, since the cable goes on to ask if "in spite of the seriousness of the situation you do not intend to send anybody"?[32]

This reference is doubtless to the growing anxiety about the lax security procedures governing the running of Soviet espionage operations in the United States. Anatoli Gromov, formerly "Resident" in London, and the manager of Philby, Burgess, MacLean, Blunt, and Cairncross, was to go to the United States in September 1944, to impose a more secure operational system (tradecraft) on the numerous KGB operations there.

BENTLEY'S SILVERMASTER NETWORK

Joseph Katz, who was to be directly subordinate to Gromov, introduced him to Elizabeth Bentley in October 1944. Thereafter, both Gromov and Katz dealt directly with Bentley.

Bentley, as Jacob Golos's successor upon his death, had been running the Silvermaster spy network, which had members in some main U.S. government departments, including the Office of the President. This network was led by Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, forwarder of the 56 rolls of photocopied information mentioned earlier.

The Silvermaster net was taken over by Akhmerov from Bentley in September 1944, after a bitter struggle between them. Bentley had opposed the takeover by KGB officers because they drove the agents too hard. Bentley's objection to the Silvermaster takeover was overruled by Earl Browder, thus showing Browder's involvement in KGB matters.

The Silvermaster net was extremely important to KGB requirements. A FBI-FOIA released report lists the members of the net:[33]

Nathan Gregory Silvermaster (Head)
Helen W. Silvermaster (wife)
Schlomer Adler
Norman C. Bursler (Department of Justice)
Virginius F. Coe
Lauchlin B. Currie, a senior aide to President Roosevelt
Bela Gold
Irving Kaplan
Abraham Silverman

Downloaded by [University of Nebraska, Lincoln] at 17:09 13 October 2014

William L. Ullman
Anatole B. Volkov
Harry Dexter White, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury

The importance of the Silvermaster group to the USSR is demonstrated by putting the deep cover agent Akhmerov in charge, as well as by the significance of the network's reporting. Two cables alone show the caliber of its information:

> In June 1943, Robert (Silvermaster) sent a War Production Board report on arms production in the United States, including bombers, pursuit planes, tanks, propelled guns, howitzers, radar and submarines, subchasers, and the like, to the KGB.[34]

Then in December 1944, New York cabled another Silvermaster report stating: "Robert has sent us a 50-page Top Secret War Production Board report . . . on arms production in the U.S."[35]

In addition to the Silvermaster and Perlo networks, the following were KGB singleton agents being run by Elizabeth Bentley in 1945, when she was put on ice by the KGB as part of a move to tighten security.[36]

Maurice Halperin was a division chief of the office of Strategic Services who regularly reported security information. He fled to Cuba after he was exposed as a spy, and figures prominently in the Venona cables. He later lived in Canada.

J. Joseph Julius was recruited by Golos and later entered the OSS. He provided information from the Russian Division of OSS.

Joseph E. Gregg, another Golos recruit, worked for the Coordinator of Latin affairs in the U.S. government.

Lee Tenney, a Golos recruit who worked in the Balkan Division of the OSS, reported on OSS operations in general.

Mary Price Wolfe was secretary to Journalist Walter Lippmann and regularly rifled his files for the KGB. Akhmerov wanted to use her for sexual entrapment and blackmail. Bentley fought against this because Wolfe was showing strain; Browder later released her from the KGB.

Rae Elson, an active Communist, and courier of the CPUSA underground, was chosen by Katz to replace Bentley at the Soviet front, U.S. Shipping and Service Corporation.

Duncan C. Lee worked in the OSS as special assistant to Director William J. Donovan. He also figures prominently in Venona cables.

Other, less significant, Bentley contacts are too numerous to include here.

Schuster's work in Katz's First Line had a dimension greater than spotting and recruiting. He also provided operational support. In August 1944, he "found two conspirative apartments" in New York for two members of the Communist Party, Francis D. Horwitz and Paul Bernay.[37] The latter was probably a U.S. official since

Downloaded by [University of Nebraska, Lincoln] at 17:09 13 October 2014

he had recently returned from Egypt, wartime travel then being greatly restricted. "Conspirative" doesn't reveal whether the apartments were safe houses or simply sanitized residential places. In any event, they were intended to deceive the FBI.

Schuster resurrected a former KGB contact when he recommended Peter Christopher Rhodes, who worked for the Office of War Information, as a "reliable fellow" in August 1944. Rhodes had been "connected with Jacob Golos in prior years."[38] In fact, Bentley testified that Golos had met Rhodes, a newspaperman and writer, several times in 1941 and 1942, but she did not know what types of information he gave Golos.[39]

Schuster's report of Rhodes's return to New York and his recommendation would have been the reason Katz and Akhmerov exerted heavy pressure upon Bentley to renew contact with Rhodes. Bentley then called Mrs. Rhodes requesting a renewal of contact and received an adamant refusal. Katz, however, insisted that Bentley make a further effort, but Bentley refused, saying it was no use. That seemed to end the Rhodes operation. Not so. Gromov followed up in the summer of 1945, asking Bentley to arrange with Mrs. Rhodes to set up a meeting between Peter and "some new Russian contact." Bentley's second refusal for the same reason she turned down Katz would not have set well with Gromov.[40] In all likelihood the recruitment effort was continued by other agents or KGB officers, but not by Gromov who would be leaving the United States soon.

THE STONE MYSTERY

There has long been controversy about journalist I. F. Stone's connection with the KGB. Certain aspects of the media have vigorously denied any relationship, partly because of ideological beliefs and defensiveness.

Myra MacPherson's article, "The Secret War against I. F. Stone" in *The Washington Post* of 21 August 1994, is an example.[41] The article bulges with attacks on the FBI for keeping an eye on Stone, and deprecates the statements of retired KGB General Oleg Kalugin who wrote, in *The First Directorate*, that KGB headquarters had cabled him to reestablish contact with Stone because "he was a man with whom we had regular contact." He goes on to describe Stone as a "fellow traveller who made no secret of his admiration for the Soviet system."[42]

Because the Soviets had regular contact with Stone, the FBI had good reason to keep him in view, especially with Soviet espionage so widespread. While Stone may have had access to classified information, he was more likely a KGB agent of influence, espousing the Soviet line in his writings, and regularly attacking U.S. security institutions such as the FBI and the Pentagon.

The Venona cables show that he had a definite relationship with the KGB. Had more cables been decrypted, a more detailed connection with the KGB would likely

Downloaded by [University of Nebraska, Lincoln] at 17:09 13 October 2014

Downloaded by [University of Nebraska, Lincoln] at 17:09 13 October 2014

have been described. KGB communications reveal that any defense of Stone is hardly justified.

The Venona cables describe a vigorous, but at first failing, campaign by the veteran KGB officer and head of the Soviet Tass news agency, Vladimir Pravdin, to recruit Stone. The omnipresent Bernard Schuster was finally required to rescue the operation.

In September 1944, in response to a query from Moscow, the New York Resident cabled that Schuster was to be "commissioned to make a check to determine precisely his (Pancake's) relation to us." (The FBI identified the cover-name "Blin" [Pancake] as I. F. Stone.)[43]

The KGB New York Resident must have been compelled to use Schuster in the recruitment effort because he reported to Moscow that Pravdin had tried to "effect liaison three times with "Pancake" who had declined the contact three times on the grounds of being busy with trips." The message further stated that "Pancake" was prominent in the journalistic world and had "vast connections."[44] These vast connections were "persons of great interest (to the KGB)." "They are well informed. . .and provide useful comments on the foreign policy of the U.S., and listed among them is I. F. Stone."[45]

That contact procedure was somewhat maladroit for a KGB recruitment pitch. The logic of two prominent journalists, one a Russian, meeting openly (given Pravdin's known status), does not overcome the normal perception of mischief. Stone realized that, even if Pravdin did not. Also Stone had much to lose in arousing suspicion.

The following month Pravdin did finally meet Pancake face-to-face and asked him "to give us information." Pancake explained that he had "reacted negatively to overtures from Soviet Embassy representatives for "fear of consequences." He "was not refusing his aid," but "had three children and did not want to attract the attention of the FBI." Those persons making the approaches had used "insufficient caution," he said. The KGB Resident's cabled reaction was that Pancake's fear "was his unwillingness to spoil his career" since he "earned $1500.00 per month but. . .would not be averse to having a supplemental income." In response to Pravdin's question as to "liaison" (clandestine meetings for passage of information), he "replied that he would be glad to meet but he rarely visited New York City." The cable went on to record: "for the establishment of business contact with him. . .we are insisting on reciprocity."[46]

The cable exchange shows clearly Stone's willingness to cooperate with the Soviets and to accept additional income from them. "Business contact" meant espionage and "reciprocity" meant quid pro quo in the KGB vernacular. That Pancake rarely went to New York would simply mean meetings would be held in Washington, his main base.

SPOTLIGHT ON THE DISTRICT

When KGB Chief Resident Gromov arrived in the United States on 15 September 1944 he immediately established his residency at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. instead of the Soviet Consulate in New York.

The focus of KGB operations on the East Coast had shifted to the Nation's Capital, the main area of the political and economic intelligence so diligently sought by the KGB, and substantiated by its massive intelligence success with the Silvermaster and Perlo nets. Gromov's mandate was the improvement of KGB operational procedures to recruit more aggressively, to press those who were already KGB agents for more data, and to tighten the security of clandestine meetings by using more cutouts (go-betweens), and to weed out incipient dissidents such as Elizabeth Bentley.

Katz was freed of other liaisons (operations) in September 1944, and was assigned to work directly under Gromov. Schuster and Robert O. Menaker (an American agent under business cover), targeted at Trotskyite operations, were to be taken over by one Selim Khan. At the same time, in another operation, Katz was to arrange a meeting between one "Margarita (unidentified) and a new person" in mid-October. Katz had been meeting "Margarita" for some time but had made no attempt to recruit her because she was causing the KGB anguish by equating Stalinism and Nazism and, therefore, was not judged to be a reasonable risk nor a cooperative worker. At that time it was decided only to keep an eye on her.[47] Margarita continued to be of considerable concern to KGB Moscow. On 6 October 1944, New York cabled its awareness of the problem, probably in answer to headquarters insistence on further information, stating that, according to Katz, she was hostile to "our firm but not the country." She evidently explained to Katz "her hostile frame of mind and her simultaneous desire to return home." (A portion of the message was undecipherable). The New York Resident was not about to meet her personally, and informed Moscow that "there are no grounds for not trusting Katz' conclusions which were being passed on."[48]

By October 1944 the New York Resident revealed that further instructions on the Margarita matter had arrived, but he was still awaiting further information regarding Thomas L. Black, who was to meet "by password of Margarita with the new man on 24 October." While this does not clarify Margarita's role, it brings Thomas L. Black, a Katz agent and a long-time industrial chemist spy, into the picture, in a hitherto unknown operation.[49]

Handling the temperamental Margarita and her connection with Black was another operation added to Katz's workload.

It is not clear what plans Gromov, who was soon to arrive, had for Katz, but detaching him from some other operations implies an entirely new job for him and probably more work in Washington where Gromov was to be stationed. In fact, Katz had begun to manage Elizabeth Bentley, her Perlo network and several singleton

Downloaded by [University of Nebraska, Lincoln] at 17:09 13 October 2014

Downloaded by [University of Nebraska, Lincoln] at 17:09 13 October 2014

agents by this time (mid-1944), prior to Gromov's arrival in the United States. Katz and Bentley's operations in New York and Washington were very extensive. Bentley would eventually name more than 80 individuals who were providing information to the KGB from a dozen government institutions.[50]

Katz informed Bentley at their first meeting in October 1944 that Gromov had been sent to the United States to modernize KGB operations.[51] One aspect of this modernization was to have Bentley turn over to KGB control all of her agents not previously surrendered to KGB officers. When Katz became her superior she was still handling the Perlo group and several individual agents, listed later.

Akhmerov, Katz's predecessor and the leading KGB illegal (no official status) in the United States, had taken the Silvermaster network from Bentley despite her fervent objections. She finally surrendered control when she was overruled by Earl Browder, also deeply involved in Soviet espionage.

Bentley won for the time being the battle over control of Mary Wolfe Price, the former secretary who pilfered the files of Walter Lippmann. The KGB had in mind establishing her in an apartment in the Georgetown section of Washington for sexual entrapment of blackmail victims. Bentley, corroborating Schuster, claimed Price was psychologically unfit for further clandestine work.[52] At this time, Bernard Schuster was building a head of frustration at the pressure on him to recruit more spies for the KGB. In October 1944, the New York Resident complained to Moscow via cable that Schuster had failed to carry out most of the assigned tasks because he claimed that Communist Party members were unwilling to cooperate. In discussing the problem with Katz, Schuster contended that another worker in a more responsible position in the party should replace him. He felt that being a go-between was more appropriate to his modest position in the party, and insisted that Earl Browder provide such a person from the CPUSA. Schuster further stated he would not be able "to cope with our tasks."[53]

At that point in the reference cable some text was lost, but what remained indicated that some of the operational failures caused by the Schuster slowdown were in finding a replacement for "Rit" (unidentified cover name), a safe house, and making a selection of "candidates for planting in the F.B.I."[54] An informed guess would be that Schuster was to have done this work but an inkling may be given by a Katz statement to one of his agents.

At Katz's last meeting in 1947 with his long term industrial spy, Thomas L. Black, Black told Katz he was being surveilled by the FBI. It was not true. He was disillusioned with spying for the KGB but was fearful of danger if he quit outright. Katz responded by saying he knew a source in the FBI who would know if Black were under suspicion. Katz said he, too, was under suspicion.[55] This may have been said merely to reassure Black that Katz was able to look out for him.

Schuster's revolt had become so serious that the KGB Resident in New York held a personal meeting with him in an effort to solve the problem. Schuster iterated that

he could carry out independently only tasks of "identification and checking of people," and only in New York.

EARL BROWDER: KGB SPY

The New York Resident, Stephen Apresyan, then reported to Moscow that Schuster had, with Katz's approval, taken his complaint to Earl Browder, head of the CPUSA, and called the situation so abnormal he was thinking of going back to Katz and asking to be "released from work with us." Browder agreed.[56] That approval must have been given reluctantly since Schuster had been such a productive operator.

In the same cable, Apresyan reported that Schuster had said: "from the moment the reform of the organization went into effect the CPUSA members in the area had been carrying out his (Schuster's) tasks very slowly even if it involved only a slight risk." Furthermore, an incomplete sentence in the cable implied that the leading workers in the Party did not make up an acceptable proportion of the "people in the Group A line" (CPUSA espionage segment or line).[57] At that point, Apresyan, at Moscow's direction, explained to Schuster that he must perform KGB tasks without asking Browder for assistance.[58] Thereby, the KGB, in the interest of better security, was trying to separate the U.S. Communist Party from KGB operations. Browder was so deeply engaged in KGB spying that being involved with Schuster without a cutout would have been another and unnecessary security risk.

Apresyan did not quite know how to cope with the Schuster situation. He cabled Moscow that Browder had agreed to Schuster's request to stand down, much to Schuster's surprise.[59]

There had been criticism of Apresyan's work by other KGB officers. He evidently did not appreciate the value of Schuster's contribution, which had been performed in stellar fashion. Recruiting and transferring penetration agents for any intelligence organization, as any intelligence officer should know, is an exceedingly arduous and stressful task, especially with someone like Joseph Katz as a supervisor. Katz was a demanding manager.

When Schuster complained about his operations not progressing since the introduction of the Gromov tradecraft program, he was probably reacting to the new system of isolating agents from each other by a complicated arrangement of cutouts. Katz had explained the technique to Elizabeth Bentley just prior to Gromov's arrival in Washington in September 1944.

Since Browder was involved with Schuster, Katz, Bentley, the Perlo group, and other Soviet operations, his role should be clarified. Browder, as CPUSA Secretary from 1934 to 1945, long benefitted from the dogma of the liberal and leftist intelligentsia that the CPUSA did not participate in Soviet espionage against the United States. These assertions continue, despite the presentation of substantial contrary evidence over the years by Elizabeth Bentley, Professor John Earl Haynes

Downloaded by [University of Nebraska, Lincoln] at 17:09 13 October 2014

Downloaded by [University of Nebraska, Lincoln] at 17:09 13 October 2014

(along with Harvey Klehr and Fredrikh I. Firsov),[60,61] the Venona cables, the Judith Coplon, Alger Hiss, and William Remington trials, as well as dozens of articles and books.

An indication of Browder's cooperation with the KGB can be derived from a discussion Jacob Golos had with Browder in November 1943 regarding a group of KGB informants he was running. Browder evidently became involved in the operation, because after Golos's death that same month, Browder arranged with Bentley to take over the group. She met the members in John Abt's apartment in New York.[62]

Bentley indicated that Browder agreed with her and Schuster to some degree that KGB management of American assets was psychologically damaging. Browder seems to have defied Akhmerov in the assignment of the Perlo group to Bentley for management. Akhmerov sent a cable to Moscow on 29 April 1944 which stated that "for more than a year Vasilij Mikhailovich Zubilin (Resident) and I tried to get in touch with Victor Perlo and Charles Flato. For some reason Browder did not come to the meeting and just decided to put Bentley in touch with the whole group. All (of the group) occupy responsible positions in Washington, D.C."[63]

The Perlo group,[64] run by Bentley under Katz's management, was led by Victor Perlo, who was employed at the War Production Board (WPB) and provided information on aircraft production and allotment. Other members were:

Edward Joseph Fitzgerald, who also worked at the WPB and provided data on production and specifications of guns, tanks and related data.

Harold Glasser worked for the U.S. Treasury Department and provided data on economic plans. Fellow spies tried to secure his appointment to replace Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Harry Dexter White.

Allan Rosenberg, who worked in the Foreign Economic Administration, provided information on German matters, especially U.S. plans for post-war Germany.

John Abt worked for the La Follette Committee in Congress on education and labor issues.

Charles Kramer worked for the Kilgore Committee in Congress.

Solomon Aaron Lischinsky worked for the WPB, as did Henry Samuel Magdoff.

Alger Hiss worked for the State Department, while David Niven Wheeler worked on the editorial board of the Research and Analysis Division of the Office of Strategic Services.

Earl Browder's close association with the KGB was further borne out by the fact that he was the recipient of classified data. Akhmerov and Silvermaster agreed that Akhmerov would pass intelligence on the Chinese Communist Party to Browder through Gromov or Bernard Schuster.[65] As early as May 1943, Browder cabled to Moscow U.S. armament production statistics on tanks, anti-tank guns, machine guns, battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyer and merchant vessels.[66]

When Katz was acting as superior to both Bentley and Schuster he asked Bentley to see Browder about setting up cover for a Russian agent whom Katz did not identify. It was to be a business cover to conceal the exchange of a considerable amount of money. Bentley raised the matter with Browder, who agreed to discuss it with a person who she thought had been recommended by a CPUSA party functionary. Bentley learned nothing further of the matter, but there was no reason why she would.[67]

BENTLEY'S SINGLETON AGENT

Among those who served as agents for that infamous band of KGB's U.S. managers, Cedric Belfrage was surely one of the more important. He headed the black propaganda (anti-Nazi) section of the MI-6, British Security Coordination Office (BSC) in New York, led by Sir William Stephenson.

Belfrage, a British Communist, was shunted upon arrival in the United States to Jacob Golos for exploitation. Golos and Bentley judged that he turned over "extremely valuable information from the BSC files," including volumes of instructions from MI-6 to British agents. One directive on "breaking and entering" had been "patriotically contributed by the burglars of Great Britain."[68]

Belfage was identified as probably being agent "UN9" who informed the Soviets, through the interrupted Venona cables, of Allied plans and problems in Yugoslavia with Mikhailovich and Tito, as well as Winston Churchill's discussions with the BSC's Stephenson about demands for a second front in Europe. Belfrage also revealed the rivalry between the FBI and the BSC, and the loss of the British agent networks to the FBI.[69]

The importance of Belfrage to the KGB became evident, because as soon as Katz became Bentley's superior in 1944 he demanded that she put him under Russian control. Bentley resisted and consulted Earl Browder who flatly refused Katz's demand. Bentley surmised that Browder feared Belfrage's connection with British Intelligence.[70]

After World War II Belfrage worked for a leftist periodical *The National Standard*. He was deported in 1955 as an undesirable alien and subsequently wrote a book *The American Inquisition*, the title explaining the contents.[71] He died in 1990.

OTHER SCHUSTER CASES

In yet another potential recruitment operation, in September 1944 Schuster was reportedly not able to "establish Katz's contact with "Zona" (unidentified covername) until he had gotten the approval of Earl Browder." Browder "had a personal connection with her" and did not consider her trustworthy.[72] While this operation was to be reported on later, it demonstrates again the omnipresence of Katz

Downloaded by [University of Nebraska, Lincoln] at 17:09 13 October 2014

in the development of potential recruits and Browder's close connection with Soviet espionage.[73]

The same cables noted that Gromov, the new KGB resident in Washington, had arrived in the United States. He was to operate closely with Schuster and Katz.

Schuster's career as a KGB functionary did not end at that time. Later in October, 1944, New York cabled regarding further discussions with Schuster in which he was requested "to define more precisely" details of a subject not decrypted, but that was obviously another espionage operation.[74]

Despite the problems of late 1944, in early 1945 he was still providing recruits, as proven by his agitated protest to Elizabeth Bentley against KGB mistreatment of agents he had recruited or spotted from the CPUSA.[75]

Following are isolated references to espionage agents whom Schuster dealt with in one way or another, and who had probably been recruited from the Communist Party or other pro-Soviet groups, inasmuch as members of the CPUSA were Schuster's main, if not only, focus. These directives from Moscow emphasize the extent of Schuster's operational work, and that of the more shadowy Katz in the background. With only a part of their work known, the tip of the iceberg, and since much of the KGB operational correspondence would have been by dispatch (diplomatic pouch) inaccessible to the FBI, rather than cable, and since only a fraction of the KGB cable traffic has been decrypted, logic holds that Katz and Schuster were more active than was known to the FBI then and now.

In another cable there is an obscure reference to Mark Zbrowski, cover name "Kvant," for whom Schuster was making some type of arrangement which could be made only if the KGB resident would vouch for Zbrowski. That assistance, whatever it was, could scarcely be refused since Zbrowski had been useful to the KGB in a number of operations, and gave effective service in gaining the confidence and helping make possible the murder of Lev Sedov, Leon Trotsky's son and the European organizer of the Fourth International, as well as that of Rudolph Klement, Secretary of the Trotskyite Fourth International.[76] Zbrowski had a long and infamous career with the KGB, which included the effort to track down and probably to help eliminate the defector Victor Kravchenko.[77] Later he confessed to the FBI to having spent 15 years in the KGB and to the above crimes, and was jailed for five years.[78]

In a March 1945 cable, Moscow assigned Schuster to check on the actions in the United States and Canada of a person named "Davis" who had done "work" for the CPUSA in the past but was now spreading "anti-Soviet" rumors.[79] On 21 September 1944 Schuster had provided information from the CPUSA to the KGB on one "Larin" (unidentified cover name). The character sketch provided did not satisfy General P. M. Fitin, the KGB Headquarters Chief. Larin was said to be "stubborn, self-willed" and did not carry out all orders received from the CP leadership. It

Downloaded by [University of Nebraska, Lincoln] at 17:09 13 October 2014

was decided to find another candidate in the Federation of Architects, Chemists, Engineers and Technicians, a Communist front organization, who had access or was a member of a target organization.[80]

In yet another Katz-Schuster operation, and in answer to a Moscow query, New York responded that Schuster reported that "Lenson," identified as alias Mary Grohol, nee Mary Ann Grohol, had been dismissed for slackness from her work on the Spanish Committee and was in Mexico.[81]

On 3 July 1944 New York cabled Moscow about Schuster's use of "Lyuba" (unidentified cover name) who, if not put to use, would leave New York for permanent residence in another state.[82] There had been prior cable traffic on the subject on 24 June 1944, but very little of the text has been deciphered. This person is obviously another agent either in or passing through Schuster's crowded agent stable.

In November 1944, Schuster was keeping tabs on a person he had reported on previously, Samuel Jacob Rodman, a press correspondent who served overseas with UNRRA after the war. Rodman left Cairo at the beginning of October 1944, and was to go on to Yugoslavia for the "Social Service" department of UNRRA. Although fragmented, the cable reveals discussion between Schuster and Rodman about the "task of gathering more detailed information."[83] Rodman would have been well situated to report on U.S. policy in a Balkan area of great interest to the USSR that would later fall under Stalin's control as a member of the Soviet Bloc until Tito revolted and pulled out.

HELPING STALIN

The massive KGB campaign in the United States was highly successful in procuring the secret details of the Manhattan nuclear energy research project at Los Alamos. The stolen data materially advanced the timing of Soviet production of an atomic bomb, thus creating universal fear of a nuclear holocaust.

In addition, the KGB secured reams of details on U.S. war materiel production and allocation priorities, thereby strengthening Stalin's demands for larger allocations. Another major KGB mission was the conduct of industrial espionage and to that purpose, among other operations, Joseph Katz ran Thomas L. Black, an industrial chemist, for ten years, and Jacob Golos recruited Julius Rosenberg because of his work as an engineer on military electronics.

The KGB spied successfully in other areas, and by the use of agents of influence, undoubtedly strengthened the sympathetic pro-Soviet views of the U.S. media for a World War II ally locked in a bitter struggle against Nazi Germany.

Since Stalin was a paranoid personality and the KGB, at home and abroad, was his power base and reflected his paranoia, he was never able to understand the principles of democracy. Consequently, the KGB searched for sinister aspects of

Downloaded by [University of Nebraska, Lincoln] at 17:09 13 October 2014

U.S. policy, growing especially from the Soviet leader's obsession that the Western allies would make a separate peace with anti-Hitler elements in Germany. Since betrayal was natural for Stalin, he would attribute that characteristic to others as a matter of course. An example was his own betrayal of the Western allies through the Nazi-Soviet pact with Hitler in 1939, and his hope of mastering a war-weakened Europe, as he was able to do in Eastern Europe after the war.

In the final analysis, the massive KGB clandestine actions in the United States were part of Stalin's aim to strengthen the "Socialist powers" and weaken the "bourgeois powers" led by the United States.

His policies and KGB actions precipitated the Cold War, forcing the United States to become the protector of the Free World at great cost to the humanitarian programs which might otherwise have been more widely implemented. Stalin's policies, whose main enforcer was the KGB in the USSR and abroad, destroyed millions of lives and caused suffering beyond conception. Finally, they resulted in the destruction of the Soviet totalitarian system, leading to the ethnic breakup of the empire created by czarist and Communist conquest.

Downloaded by [University of Nebraska, Lincoln] at 17:09 13 October 2014

REFERENCES

[1] National Security Agency, *Introductory History of Venona & Guide to the Translations*, Center for Cryptologic History, Fort George G. Meade, MD, 20755–6000 Attn. E322, p. 7.

[2] Ibid. p. 8.

[3] Ibid. p. 9.

[4] Ibid. p. 9.

[5] John E. Haynes and Harvey Klehr, "Outed from the Cold," *The Weekly Standard*, 15 April 1996, p. 16.

[6] Quoted in Arch Puddington, "Red Menace-Really," *National Review*, 8 April 1996, p. 47.

[7] FBI office memo to Mr. D. M. Ladd from Mr. A. H. Belmont; Subject: Joseph Katz Espionage, Washington, D.C., 10 September 1952.

[8] Robert L. Benson, Michael Warner, eds., *Venona Soviet Espionage and the American Response 1939–1957*, National Security Agency, Washington, D.C., 1996, p. 192.

[9] Anthony Cave Brown and Charles B. MacDonald, *On a Field of Red*, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1981, p. 345.

[10] Elizabeth Bentley, *Out of Bondage*, New York: Ballantine Books, 1988, p. 187.

[11] The Committee on Un–American Activities, U.S. House of Representatives, "The Shameful Years," Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1952, p. 47.

[12] Ibid. p. 48.

[13] Bentley, op. cit., pp. 187–188.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid. p. 177.

[16] KGB cable, New York to Moscow #94, 23 January 1945.
[17] *The Washington Post*, 25 December 1996, p. A 18.
[18] Bentley, op. cit., p. 130.
[19] New York to Moscow #1340, 21 September 1944.
[20] Moscow to New York #49, 19 January 1944.
[21] New York to Moscow #619, 4 May 1944.
[22] New York to Moscow #1020, 20 July 1944.
[23] New York to Moscow #1332, 18 September 1944.
[24] New York to Moscow #1715, 5 December 1944.
[25] Moscow to New York #295, 30 March 1945.
[26] New York to Moscow #749, 26 May 1944.
[27] New York to Moscow #638, 6 May 1944.
[28] FBI, New York Report, 8 November 1950, File #65–14913, and 65–57913 SI 304.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story*, New York: HarperCollins, 1990, p. 387.
[31] New York to Moscow #1050, 26 July 1944.
[32] New York to Moscow #3243a, 26 July 1944.
[33] FOIA, FBI Report, New York #65–14913, 8 November 1950.
[34] New York to Moscow #1017–1022, 29–30 June 1943.
[35] New York to Moscow #1821, 26 December 1944.
[36] FBI, New York, Report #65–14913, 8 November 1950.
[37] New York to Moscow #1166, 16 August 1944.
[38] New York to Moscow #1221, 26 August 1944.
[39] Bentley, p. 326.
[40] FBI Report, 8 November 1950, #65–14913 and #65–57913, SI 304.
[41] Myra Mac Pherson, "The Secret War Against I. F. Stone," *The Washington Post*, 21 August 1994.
[42] Oleg Kalugin, *The First Directorate*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, p. 74.
[43] New York to Moscow #1313, 13 September 1944.
[44] Ibid.
[45] New York to Moscow #1433–1435, 10 October 1944.
[46] New York to Moscow #1506, 23 October 1944.
[47] New York to Moscow #1337, 19 September 1944.
[48] New York to Moscow #1411, 6 October 1944.
[49] New York to Moscow #1430, 10 October 1944.
[50] Robert J. Lamphere and Tom Schachtman, *The FBI–KGB War*, New York: Random House, 1986, p. 39.

Downloaded by [University of Nebraska, Lincoln] at 17:09 13 October 2014

[51] Bentley, p. 172.
[52] Bentley, p. 137.
[53] New York to Moscow #1410, 6 October 1944.
[54] New York to Moscow #1410, 6 October 1944.
[55] FBI Philadelphia teletype to Director, Washington, D.C., 24 June 1950.
[56] New York to Moscow #1457, 14 October 1944.
[57] New York to Moscow #1457, 14 October 1944.
[58] New York to Moscow #1512, 24 October 1944.
[59] New York to Moscow #1457, 14 October 1944.
[60] John E. Haynes, *Red Scare or Red Menace*, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996, p. 61.
[61] Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Fredrikh I. Firsov, *The Secret World of American Communism*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995, p. 233.
[62] FBI Report, New York #65–14913, 8 November 1950 and 65–57913; SI 304 KGB Cable New York to Moscow #588, 29 April 1944.
[63] New York to Moscow #588, 29 April 1944.
[64] FBI New York Report #65–14913, 8 November 1950.
[65] New York to Moscow #14, 4 January 1945.
[66] New York to Moscow #774, 775, and 776, 26 May 1943.
[67] FBI Report New York #65–14913 and 65–7913, SI 304, 7 November 1950.
[68] Bentley, p. 139.
[69] New York to Moscow, #592, 29 April 1943; #725, 19 May 1943; and #2267a, 29 May 1943.
[70] FBI, New York, Report #65–59713, 8 November 1950.
[71] William L. O'Neill, *A Better World: The Great Schism: Stalinism and the American Intellectuals*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982, p. 206.
[72] New York to Moscow #1328, 15 September 1944.
[73] Klehr, Haynes, and Firsov, pp. 233–234.
[74] New York to Moscow #1522, 27 October 1944.
[75] Bentley, pp. 187–188.
[76] Andrew and Gordievsky, p. 164.
[77] New York to Moscow #87, 19 January 1945.
[78] Lamphere, p. 88.
[79] Moscow to New York #194, 3 March 1945.
[80] New York to Moscow #1340, 21 September 1944.
[81] New York to Moscow #1029, 22 July 1944.
[82] New York to Moscow #939, 3 July 1944.
[83] New York to Moscow #1553, 4 November 1944.

Downloaded by [University of Nebraska, Lincoln] at 17:09 13 October 2014